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Abstract 
The vibrant bilateral relations between Indonesia-Vietnam has been tested by the “Sink 
the Vessels policy”, a robust measure executed by Indonesia to tackle rampant illegal 
fishing that encroach Indonesian waters. The policy has caused in the demolition of, 
among else, Vietnamese fishing vessels; and has also led to near-clash and incidents at 
sea. Nevertheless, both countries bilateral relations were far from hostile condition, and 
uphold their neighbourly relations to manage the illegal fishing problem. How could 
Indonesia’s foreign policy action not further exacerbate Indonesia-Vietnam relations post 
“Sink the Vessels” policy? To tackle our question, this article probes to describe the 
complex systems underlying the relations between Indonesia and Vietnam during the 
rising tension. We argue that the complex systems encapsulated Indonesia – Vietnam 
relations post “Sink the Vessels” policy consist of symbol system, interest system, and 
role system that maintain their friendly bilateral relations, even in the turbulent ocean. 
This article exposes that Indonesia-Vietnam responds to tackle the problem stems 
primarily from the linkage between the three systems to escape the security dilemma.  
Key words: Indonesia, Vietnam, illegal fishing, sink the vessels, complex systems 
 
Introduction 
Since 2010, the improved bilateral 
relations between Indonesia and Vietnam 
have brought significant proximity of the 
two nations. In 2013, the adjacency 
between the two nations reached its peak 
due to a strategic partnership between 
Indonesia and Vietnam was being 
commenced. The Strengthening 
cooperation between them makes Vietnam 
as the only strategic partner of Indonesia 
in Southeast Asia (Anjaiah, 2011). 
However, this optimistic trajectory has 
been tested by a tough measure exercised 
by Indonesia's President Joko Widodo in 
encountering rampant illegal fishing in 
Indonesian waters. The policy has 
resulted in the demolition of, among else, 
Vietnamese fishing vessels; and has also 
led to near-clash and incidents in the 
maritime domain. 
After Joko Widodo came into office 
on 2014; Indonesia astonished the world 
by Joko Widodo’s administration firm 
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policy to detonate domestic and foreign 
fishing vessels caught stealing fish in 
Indonesian waters. The policy known as 
"Sink the Vessels" (STV), commanded by 
the Minister of Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries “Susi Pudjiastuti”, one of 
Indonesia’s ministerial rank that is 
infamous of her dedication for delivering 
her duties to protect Indonesia’s marine 
resources. By far, public in Indonesia 
regarded the STV policy as a symbol of 
Indonesian government considerable 
measure to pursue “Global Maritime 
Axis” agenda by President Joko Widodo. 
This agenda demands the ability of 
Indonesia to secure its maritime security 
and national sovereignty for the sake of 
the future Indonesian prosperity. Some 
says that this policy originated from Joko 
Widodo’s utmost admiration toward 
Indonesia’s vast territorial waters and the 
long-standing ‘archipelagic outlook’. 
Rather than valuing Indonesian 
archipelago as a natural disadvantage, 
President Widodo regards the waters for 
its economic potential and as national 
strength (Gindarsah & Priamarizki, 2015, 
p.15). Indonesian governance 
acknowledges the policy as highly 
important. 
Post to STV Policy, the mass media 
keep broadcasting the amount of Vietnam 
vessels seized by Indonesian Patrol Ship 
in Natuna Waters (Al Birra, 2017). From 
the geopolitical approach, obviously the 
involvement of South China Sea claimant 
states is inevitable on this issue (for 
instance Vietnam, in our case, as a 
claimant state over the South China Sea 
territorial dispute whose fishermen have 
been heavily be caught doing illegal 
fishing activities). Thus, it is predictable 
that the detonation of foreign fishing 
vessels policy triggered protests from 
neighbouring countries, especially from 
whose fishing vessels seized and 
detonated by Indonesian government. 
Nevertheless, Indonesia has consistently 
and firmly stood to their STV policy and 
unwilling to reconsider its unilateral 
movement, even in the midst of 
opposition by neighbouring states (Deny, 
2018). 
Interestingly, so far, Vietnam's 
toughest response to Indonesia's national 
policy is in the form of reminder that such 
unilateral action violates the 2003-2004 
Continental Bilateral Agreement between 
Indonesia-Vietnam which is still in the 
process of delimiting its authority. Other 
than those steps, Vietnam also sent 
diplomatic note to Indonesia to maintain 
good bilateral relations between the two 
countries, by prioritizing the principle of 
cooperation and understanding by stating 
that Indonesia must “(pay) attention to the 
strategic partnership of the two nations” 
in dealing with Vietnamese fishermen” 
(Parameswaran, 2015). 
Departing from the above 
mentioned context, authors questioned 
how Indonesia’s foreign policy action did 
not further aggravated Indonesia-Vietnam 
relations post “Sink the Vessels” policy? 
This article probes to describe the complex 
systems that enchase Indonesia and 
Vietnam behaviour during the rising 
tension. We argue that complex systems 
approach as a conceptual tool offers a 
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noteworthy insight to understand this 
case, especially to captured holistically, 
Indonesia – Vietnam relations post “Sink 
the Vessels” policy. Using this approach, 
we draw the interaction between symbol 
system, interest system, and role system 
that encapsulated the unbreakable 
relations between Indonesia-Vietnam, 
even in the turbulence ocean. This article 
found that the response of Indonesia and 
Vietnam in tackling the problem stems 
primarily from the linkage between the 
three systems that helps escape the 
security dilemma.  Using qualitative 
research methods and in-depth interview 
with some primary sources, this paper 
conducted in-depth study to thoroughly 
uncover Indonesia-Vietnam relations post 
STV policy. 
Theoretical Framework: Foreign Policy 
Action and Complex Systems Approach 
According to Vinsensio Dugis, 
foreign policy is traditionally understood 
as authoritative action taken or is officially 
decided by governments both to maintain 
the desirable aspects of the international 
environment and to change its 
undesirable aspects. Therefore, in its basic 
understanding, foreign policy 
encompasses of statements and actions 
taken by state subjects to its relations with 
other external actors, states or non-state 
actors (Dugis, 2008). Then, in order to 
analyse foreign policy, there are three 
main features of foreign policy: sources of 
foreign policy, the process of producing 
the sources become policy, and actions 
taken to implement it (Dugis, 2008). 
By this explanation, we could 
agree upon three different trajectories to 
distinguish the three main features of 
foreign policy. Theoretical instrument for 
analysing foreign policy can be divided 
into three groups; systemic theories, 
societal theories, and state-centric theories 
(Barkdull & Harris, 2002, pp.63-90). 
According to Dugis (2008), the first stream 
denotes to scholars that eager to scrutinise 
and elaborate foreign policy by 
questioning about how the international 
system implicates the conduct of foreign 
policy between actors in international 
relations. In our words, to tackle the 
dynamic of external environment within 
international system, states adjust their 
existence through foreign policy as a 
strategic instrument. The second group 
advocates foreign policy by emphasizing 
the importance of domestic aspects, 
especially the combination of domestic 
politics and the culture of a particular 
country. These theories stress on the spirit 
to dismantle the “black box” of state as 
unitary actor and highlight the importance 
of domestic political factors over foreign 
policy. The third group is theories that 
chase the answers to questions regarding 
foreign policy within the structure of the 
state, and this also includes the 
individuals who transmit and implement 
foreign policies on behalf of their country. 
In other words, individuals and their 
occupying institutions are seen as 
instrumental in analysing foreign policy. 
Our theoretical framework supported the 
first group among those three theories of 
foreign policy. Whereby, we aim for 
systematic explanation regarding 
Indonesia-Vietnam foreign policy action 
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to tackle the dynamic of external 
environment within international system, 
especially to manage the rising tension 
cause by illegal fishing activity. Therefore, 
we utilize complex systems approach to 
draw systematic explanation regarding 
those two countries bilateral relations 
during the rising tension. 
The complex system as a 
terminology used in this paper exhibits 
the concatenation of interconnected and 
interdependent parts between actors in 
international system. According to Rusadi 
Kantaprawira (1987), ‘the system can be 
defined as a unit which is formed of 
several elements, or components, or part 
of each other are in a latch-hook 
attachment and functional. Each is 
cohesive with one another. It means the 
aggregate of the unit maintained intact its 
existence. The system can be construed 
also as something higher than just a 
means, procedures, plans, schemes, or 
method. Furthermore, the system is a 
mechanism patterned manner and 
consistent, even the mechanism is often 
automatic’. It means that the system is 
everywhere around us, the world is the 
shed of systems. 
According to Kazuko Hirose 
Kawaguchi (2003), a complex system can 
be understood as a set of systems; In other 
words, the most important features of the 
complex systems are interconnectedness 
and the emergence, i.e. the fact that the 
whole cannot be reduced to the sum of the 
components (Cîndea, 2006). However, the 
most important thing is not to decompose 
a complex system into lower level 
complexities, or to increase the level on a 
scale of increasing complex, instead, we 
should look at the logic of the interaction 
and the manner in which it reaches the 
emergence of the phenomena. In complex 
systems, from the living cell to the global 
social system, we can essentially identify 
infinity of levels of the organization 
(Kusumawardhana, 2017). Departing from 
this vantage point, we define complex 
system as a collective of two or more 
simple systems. 
Based on our conceptual 
understanding, in any action and 
interaction within international system, 
actors stand as an important and dynamic 
unit in our realm of thought. Within a 
larger social unit (for instance, an actor 
within a family, society, nation, or a 
collection of nations or the international 
community as a whole in the case of 
international relations), we could 
conceptualized an actor as a complex 
entity, especially if the actor has 
expectations and principles of action are 
implicated by various restraints, and 
when, that actor contributes in the growth, 
maintenance, and development of that 
larger social unit while making its own 
view thereof, mediated by symbols of 
various kinds (Kawaguchi, 2003, p. 45). 
Realities that bind the human world, 
however, encompasses many systems in 
each of which a diverse action principle 
operates. This is how, actors in our view, 
situated in myriad uncertainty and 
ambiguity within international system as 
a larger social unit that constrain their 
existence. 
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Therefore, making a social 
phenomenon into parsimony theoretical 
hypotheses, is not a trivial matter, but 
requires careful intellectual work to deal 
with all its complexity, uncertainty, and 
diversity intact. In this context, the best 
that one can do is to draw the simplest 
possible ideal type that represent the 
essential characteristic of that complex 
phenomenon. To embrace this possibility, 
Kawaguchi (2003) depicted some 
guidance regarding this ideal type by 
explaining that actors’ types of behaviour 
can be construed into three different and 
independent types of behaviour, each of 
this type can be exercised as analytical 
concept or in his terminology “ideal 
types”. Departing from the enormously 
complex array of definite behaviour that 
takes place in the world; he illustrated the 
three types of behaviour are interest-
oriented behaviour, role-expected 
behaviour, and symbol-oriented 
behaviour, and the three types of systems 
that correspond thereto are interest 
systems, role systems, and symbol systems, 
respectively (Kawaguchi, 2003, p. 46). 
Moreover, Kawaguchi elaborates 
his theoretical framework into three clear 
definition as follows; interest-oriented 
behaviour signifies the logic of an 
individual actor, while role-expected 
behaviour is the behaviour likely of an 
individual actor according to the logic of 
the whole within which he or she is 
situated (Kawaguchi, 2003, p. 46). 
Furthermore, symbol-oriented behaviour is 
behaviour whose frame of reference is a 
symbol system. Wherever, symbol 
systems exist self-sufficiently of reality 
(matter and energy); furthermore, if this 
independent system interacting in intense 
dialogue with reality- a dialogue that 
involves of recurrent interactions with it-
these systems develop ordered relations 
among themselves that can be stated as 
laws (Kawaguchi, 2003, p.48). 
The study toward this certain 
symbols within these systems has often 
been done in social sciences, commonly 
focus on analysing shared knowledge 
among members of certain society, 
especially to understand the impact of this 
shared knowledge toward decisions and 
actions of those members, and how those 
constitutive aspect contribute to the 
preservation and control of social 
structures or social order (such symbols 
include laws, norms, traditions, 
ideologies, and ideals such as democracy 
or human rights). Additionally, the bodies 
of knowledge equipped by social, cultural, 
and natural sciences are themselves 
among the symbol systems that can be 
studied by social scientists (Kawaguchi, 
2003, p.49). To summarize these three 
aspects, in our explanation - state to state 
interactions determined by interest-
oriented behaviour, constrain by role-
expected behaviour, and influenced by 
symbol-oriented behaviour. 
The first system, “Interest”, plays 
an important role that dictates state 
behaviour in the international system. In 
other words, state behaviour in 
international system tends to come from 
the most basic behaviour that is which 
promotes the continued existence of the 
actor. Whereby, if we agree upon the 
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survival of an actor as an important 
interest among the member of 
international system, and regard 
behaviour that obliges to promote one's 
own survival as interest-oriented 
behaviour. In the case of a nation, let us 
call such behaviour national-interest 
oriented behaviour (Kawaguchi, 2003, 
p.51). Moreover, a certain actor's interests 
originate internally from that actor and 
that they abide in isolation from the whole 
in which that actor is situated (if the actor 
is a nation, it refers to the international 
community) (Kawaguchi, 2003). 
Meanwhile, the role system is 
based on the existence of a goal that must 
be attained if the system itself is to remain 
in existence (Kawaguchi, 2003, p.59). 
Whereby a system's goal is accomplished 
through a synchronised division of labour, 
known as role differentiation, among the 
members of the system (the actors or 
parts). The share of labour expected of an 
individual member is known as a role 
expectation, and behaviour grounded 
solely on a role expectation can be 
understood as role-expected behaviour 
(Kawaguchi, 2003, p.59). 
The third system was symbol 
system. The concepts of an interest system 
and a role system can be understood as 
specific abstractions from certain features 
of social phenomena or interactions 
between actors internationally that can be 
elucidated by, correspondingly, both at 
the level of individual logic and the logic 
of the whole. This third category of system 
can be recognised though a careful study 
toward the same social phenomena or 
international relations among actors: a 
symbol system, that is, a special case of a 
system of signs that embody and carry 
those aspects of social phenomena or 
international relations that Kawaguchi 
(2003) mention as the 'realities' thereof (or 
aspects of 'matter and energy'). Among 
states, according to our understanding, 
common or general interests are shaped 
by a similar process that produce a certain 
meaning through symbols. Example of 
this can be seen when international 
community was discussing about the 
international regime to manage resources 
on ocean floor or the sea-bed and in the 
subsoil thereof (In the context of 
development or exploitation and 
exploration) at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (Treves, 
1982). In our opinion, the interests and 
positions of any nations featured by these 
specific maritime features progressively 
converged in one trajectory and those of 
the 'have-not' nations gradually 
converged in another, while repetitively 
attract conflictual relations among them. 
Based on the above mentioned 
conceptual discussion, we draw complex 
system analytical framework to analyse 
Indonesia-Vietnam relations post “Sink 
the Vessels” policy (Figure.1). Our 
framework consists of three level of 
systems analysis, namely State System, 
International System, and Symbol System. 
The linkage of those three systems 
captured the interaction between states in 
international system, particularly in our 
case, Indonesia-Vietnam relations to tackle 
illegal fishing problem that tested their 
bilateral relations lately. In the remaining 
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sections of this paper, we will examine 
both state system of Indonesia and 
Vietnam based on interest system, role-
expectation system, and symbol system. 
Thereafter, we draw some explanation 
about the linkage between Indonesia-
Vietnam national interest with the 
international system as a larger system in 
the social structure that encapsulated their 
existence. At the last analysis, we 
scrutinize the influence of symbol system 
during the rising tension between 
Indonesia-Vietnam in this issue. 
 
Figure.1 Complex Systems Analytical Framework 
State System: Interest, Role Expectation, 
and Symbol in a Turbulence Ocean 
In this section, we will analyse 
Interest, Role Expectation, and Symbol as the 
foundation of state system, both Indonesia 
and Vietnam. By elaborating each part of 
the three system within state, we hope for 
gaining comprehensive understanding 
about the nature of actor in the rising 
tension at play within the larger system. 
On Indonesia: Wawasan Nusantara, 
Nationalistic Ideology, and Global 
Maritime Axis 
According to Kawaguchi (2003, 
p.52), in order to come with a clear 
understanding about how national 
interests evolve by the dynamic of 
international system, we must perceive 
the nation itself as a system and to enquire 
the explicit or implicit objective has been 
established to uphold that system's 
existence. Furthermore, he emphasized 
that the key to grasp comprehensive 
understanding toward conflict resolution 
among actors lies on the processes by 
which conflict is resolved among 
conflicting interests of the individuals and 
interest groups that make up a nation 
must be measured carefully, in 
conjunction with the nature of the overall 
national interests that arise as a 
consequence of those processes and that 
are asserted in relation to the external 
world. Consequently, this would 
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encourage our efforts to scrutinise the 
structure within the black box of nation-
state as a system, in the context of its 
foreign policy. 
Friedrich Ratzel believed that the 
state is a geographical organism. 
Understanding Indonesia from this point 
of view, we can denote, the archipelago 
geographically has acted as an important 
aspect that influenced the history of 
Indonesia. In fact, until now, it is the 
largest archipelagic state in the world. Its 
gigantic size is salience by the geostrategic 
location for the Asia Pacific region both 
geopolitically or geoeconomically, which 
controls four of out of the seven major 
maritime chokepoints in the world (Habir 
et al, 2013). In addition, the rich natural 
resources be inherent in within the 
archipelago, including oil and gas, 
intensifies the strategic importance of 
Indonesia. Despite geographical 
advantages, there is a paradox due to the 
size of the country and its resources also 
brings insecurities in Indonesian policy 
makers as they struggle to ward off 
external threats and to manage internal 
security threats to the unity of the country 
(Laksmana, 2011). According to Ahmad 
Derry Habir et al (2013), this outlook has 
been influenced by a history of the 
archipelago that highlighted – with few 
exemptions such as the precolonial 
kingdoms of Sriwijaya and Majapahit – 
geographically limited land-based 
powers. 
After Indonesia claims its 
independence from colonial power, they 
delineated its territorial sovereignty based 
on the Netherlands 1939 Ordinance on 
Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones, 
which had divided the archipelago into 
several areas. These territorial divisions 
and the three-mile extent of its territorial 
sovereignty were later apprehended as the 
source of Indonesia’s vulnerability to 
foreign maritime infringement in the 
archipelago. Consequently, the vastness of 
the archipelagic boundaries at that time 
presented a real challenge for Indonesia, 
some of which, related to the increase of 
smuggling and growing regional unrest. 
In December 1957, to tackle the urgency of 
this concerns then Prime Minister Juanda 
Kartawidjaja deprived the 1939 Ordinance 
and declared Indonesia an ‘archipelagic 
state’. The archipelagic state referred to a 
belt of baselines (islands and water 
between islands) that contained the 
territory of the Indonesian modern state. 
Thereafter, when President Suharto’s New 
Order came to power, they formulated the 
Archipelagic Outlook or Wawasan 
Nusantara in 1966, based on the Juanda 
Declaration. 
With the official commitment to 
the Wawasan Nusantara concept, the New 
Order government engaged on diplomatic 
campaign for the recognition of the 
Archipelagic State concept in the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
and various international forums. 
Eventually, the two decades of Indonesian 
diplomacy's efforts led to the concept of 
archipelagic state was adopted in 1982 by 
the third United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). 
Indonesia ratified the UNCLOS in 1985 
through Law No. 17/1985 (Habir et al, 
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2013). Moreover, to spread the concept of 
the archipelagic state throughout the 
country, citizenship and national 
resilience education became the most 
important agenda of the new order 
regime. Regardless of these domestic and 
international developments, the Wawasan 
Nusantara has been principally inward-
looking instead of outward-looking in 
spirit, it appears from the tendency to 
emphasize continuously on Indonesia's 
strategic geographical location, a distrust 
towards potentially exploitive external 
powers wishing to take advantage of the 
location and Indonesian resources, and a 
concern for national unity in the face of 
separatist threats. 
After the emergence of Post-New 
order democratic system, President 
Yudhoyono navigated Indonesia’s foreign 
policy to an active and outward 
orientation grounded on democratic and 
idealistic values. In May 2005, during his 
first foreign policy speech, shortly after he 
was elected president, he defined 
Indonesian nationalism as ‘a brand of 
nationalism that is open, confident, 
moderate, tolerant, and outward looking’ 
(Yudhoyono, 2005). Moreover, frequently 
the president highlighted the same 
themes, emphasising tolerance as an 
important component of freedom and 
democracy. For example, when he opened 
the 2011 Bali Democracy Forum, he stated, 
‘we believe that freedom must be coupled 
with tolerance and rule of law, for without 
them freedom leads to unbridled hatred 
and anarchy’ (Habir et al, 2013). The 
shifted trajectory of Indonesian foreign 
policy from inward-looking to more open 
and outward-looking, multilateral-
oriented, and grounded to norms within 
international law during President 
Yudhoyono leadership, in some extent 
overshadowed the discourse about 
Wawasan Nusantara. Arguably, in the 
practice of these foreign policy, the 
traditionally independent and active 
foreign policy of Indonesia – as 
formulated by the first Indonesian Vice 
President Mohammad Hatta – has been 
adapted to the present globalisation 
period. Whereby, the core interest of 
Indonesian foreign policy, at that period, 
was perceived as reinforced Indonesia’s 
image as independence and activism as a 
peace maker, confidence builder, problem 
solver, and bridge builder (Rosyidin & Tri 
Andika, 2017). 
However, Indonesia’s foreign 
policy after the election of Joko Widodo 
(Jokowi) shows a different trajectory. 
Unlike his predecessor, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, Jokowi has seemed less 
ambitious in bringing Indonesia onto the 
world stage (Rosyidin, 2017).  Based on 
Jokowi’s vantage point, Indonesia is a 
“regional power with selective global 
engagement” (Widodo and Kalla, 2014, 
p.13). Following a mantra of ‘pro-people 
diplomacy’, Jokowi desires to transform 
Indonesia’s foreign policy into an action 
that can contribute directly to the interests 
of the people. This involves a foreign 
policy orientation that leans towards the 
domestic rather than the international 
(Rosyidin, 2017). 
The most salient example of 
Jokowi’s aggression is his policy of 
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sinking illegal fishing boats. In 2014, 
Interior Minister Tjahyo Kumolo asserted 
that the government should take 
aggressive decisions on behalf of the 
dignity and honour of the country, 
defending its territorial sovereignty and 
protecting natural resources (CNN 
Indonesia, 2014). To support this 
commitment, Indonesia strengthened STV 
policy by creating special task force to 
Eradicate Illegal Fishing namely SATGAS 
115, which was endorsed by President 
Joko Widodo through Presidential Decree 
No. 115 in 2015 (Marta, 2017). In other 
words, SATGAS 115 signifies Indonesia's 
commitment to defend its sovereignty 
through reinforcing law enforcement 
capacity by initiating a one-roof 
enforcement system, which consists of 
elements of the Indonesian Navy, 
National Police, BAKAMLA, and the 
Republic of Indonesia Prosecutor's Office. 
Also, to facilitate coordination, encourage 
synergy, and carry out facilitation 
functions in combating illegal fishing. This 
nationalist sentiment was also evident 
when Indonesian officials later announced 
that the government would sink 71 
foreign vessels as Indonesia 
commemorated 71 years of independence 
(Parameswaran, 2016). 
Besides, Indonesia also reacted 
directly after Chinese fishing boats 
trespassed the waters off Natuna, an 
Indonesian territory. To demonstrate his 
commitment to defend Indonesia’s 
sovereignty, Jokowi held a cabinet 
meeting from the warship KRI Imam 
Bonjol, sending a signal to the Chinese 
government that it should not violate on 
Indonesian sovereignty. As reported by 
Jakarta Post, Cabinet Secretary Pramono 
Anung blatantly underlined this symbolic 
political stand point, “[N]atuna belongs to 
the Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia [NKRI] and that’s final. As the 
head of government and the head of state, 
the President wants to make sure that 
Natuna always remains part of Indonesia” 
(Jakarta Post, 2016). At this point, we 
could grasp some understanding that 
Indonesia’s under Jokowi’s leadership 
wants to pursue their national interest 
based on its archipelagic outlook as a 
symbol, economic interest, and limited 
strategic interaction with external actors 
as a role-expectation. This system 
behaviour reconfigured Indonesia’s state 
system to be more inward-looking rather 
than outward-looking orientation. 
On Vietnam: Self Reliance and 
Independence, Anti-External Aggressor, 
and Economic Prosperity 
Overtime, Vietnam’s foreign policy 
has experienced dramatic shifts one way 
or another, propelled by structural 
changes at the international system level 
and domestic political change. The first 
major theme of Vietnam’s current foreign 
policy is the stress on independence and 
self-reliance. This is based on three 
historical legacies: first, resistance to 
foreign intervention during the colonial 
and post-colonial eras; second, as a 
member of the socialist camp when 
Vietnam was caught in the crossfire of the 
Sino-Soviet dispute; and third as a 
dependent ally that was left isolated when 
the Soviet Union suddenly collapsed in 
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1991. According to Vietnam’s National 
Defence white paper, it stated “Vietnam 
consistently realizes the foreign guideline 
of independence [and] self-reliance…” 
(Ministry of National Defence, 2009). 
These two nationalistic values consistently 
uphold by Vietnamese government by 
formulating their national defence policy 
based on three principals namely “Three 
no’s”: Vietnam consistently advocates 
neither joining any military alliances nor 
giving any other countries permission to 
have military bases or use its soil to carry 
out military activities against other 
countries.” (Ministry of National Defence, 
2009: 21–22). These three principles stand 
as safeguard for Vietnam from being 
involved in scaremongering contestation 
between external powers, which often 
undermines the existence of Southeast 
Asian countries, especially the United 
States and China. Furthermore, 
Independence and Self Reliance, as 
Vietnam's primary identity as a sovereign 
country are highly reflected in the 
Vietnam defence white paper published in 
2009. As in the following sentence, 
As a nation having experienced 
wars for national independence 
and freedom, Vietnam 
thoroughly respects other 
countries’ independence, 
sovereignty, unity, territorial 
integrity and national interests 
on the basis of fundamental 
principles of the United 
Nations Charter and 
international laws. At the same 
time, Vietnam demands that its 
independence, sovereignty, 
unity, territorial integrity and 
national interests must be 
respected by other countries. 
Vietnam advocates against the 
military use of force first in 
international relations but is 
ready to resolutely fight 
against all aggressive acts 
(Ministry of National Defence, 
2009, p.19). 
Territorial integrity and unity as a 
representation of Vietnam's 
independence, embedded very strong for 
this country as a sovereign country. 
Historically, this is very reasonable, if we 
look at the long history of Vietnam, where 
its existence is determined by the struggle 
to fight external aggressor that threatened 
the very existence of this country. 
Therefore, in the national defence 
corridor, the country's white book 
reinforces the importance of independence 
and self-reliance as state identities. As 
follows “Vietnam’s national defence is 
always closely linked to the CPV and the 
State’s guideline of independence, self - 
reliance, peace, cooperation and 
development in external affairs, and the 
foreign policy of openness, 
multilateralization and diversification in 
international relations” (Ministry of 
National Defence, 2009, p.21). 
Besides emphasizing the 
affirmation of the principles of 
Independence and Self-reliance as 
guidance for Vietnam to build its foreign 
policy trajectory. Vietnam also holds firm 
and consistent for, the importance of 
maintaining an international legal regime 
as a common ground in the region and 
internationally. Especially in solving 
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various disputes that Vietnam must 
dealing with, in the contemporary era. 
This is reflected in the Vietnam Defence 
White Paper with the following sentence 
“Vietnam’s consistent policy is to solve 
both historical and newly emerging 
disputes over territorial sovereignty in 
land and at sea through peaceful means 
on the basis of international laws” 
(Ministry of National Defence, 2009). 
Obviously, threats related to the territorial 
integrity faced by Vietnam are certainly 
related to the dispute in the South China 
Sea which has the potential to trigger open 
conflict between Vietnam and the larger 
Chinese government. 
Therefore, on a larger context 
Vietnam considers the existence of 
UNCLOS to be very important to be a 
joint reference, especially as a basis for 
defining the problem of territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea. In this 
case, UNCLOS as an international 
maritime regime is acting more than as a 
common norm but also an identity that 
gives meaning to Vietnam’s territorial 
integrity in the international system. This 
acknowledgment appears in the following 
sentence. 
“As for disputed sovereignty 
rights at sea, though there is 
sufficient historical evidence 
and legal foundation to prove 
Vietnam’s undeniable 
sovereignty over water areas 
and islands in the East Sea, 
including the Paracels and the 
Spratlys, it is always ready to 
negotiate with all parties 
concerned to find peaceful 
solutions to those disputes in 
conformity with regulations of 
the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (Ministry of National 
Defence, 2009, p.19)”. 
In addition to UNCLOS, when 
Vietnam dealing with the issue of 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea, 
ASEAN as a regional institution has an 
important role also. Vietnam’s national 
defence white paper reflecting this notion, 
whereas Vietnam expressed the 
importance for all parties to the dispute to 
respect the Declaration of Conduct 
regarding South China Sea problematic 
condition, and jointly resolve the 
discussion of the Code of Conduct for 
resolving the problems that occurred 
(Ministry of National Defence, 2009, p.19). 
In the light of this view, we can 
understand ASEAN is also an important 
institution for Vietnam, because 
discussions related to COC with China are 
carried out within the framework of 
dialogue between ASEAN-China. 
Consequently, Vietnam promotes defence 
cooperation between ASEAN countries 
based on security cooperation mechanism 
to build the ASEAN community. 
The second major theme of 
Vietnamese foreign policy is the 
multilateralization and diversification of 
external relations. This objective stands for 
the role-expectation of Vietnam as an actor 
in contemporary international system. On 
May 20, 1988, the VCP Politburo adopted 
a seminal policy document known as 
Resolution No. 13 entitled, “On the Tasks 
and Foreign Policy in the New Situation.” 
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This document codified Vietnam’s foreign 
policy by giving priority to economic 
development and calling for a “multi-
directional foreign policy” orientation 
with the goal of making “more friends, 
fewer enemies” (thêm bạn, bớt thù). 
Specifically, Resolution 13 called for 
Vietnam’s extrication from the conflict in 
Cambodia in order to normalize relations 
with China, develop relations with 
ASEAN states, Japan, and Europe, and 
“step-by-step” normalize relations with 
the United States. 
This trajectory also denote 
Vietnam’s foreign policy want to pursue 
“cooperation and struggle” among 
nations, especially to pursue economic 
international integration for the welfare of 
Vietnamese society. In 1986, Vietnam 
adopted “đổi mới” or renovation and, two 
years later, mapped out a major 
reorientation of its foreign policy. To 
overcome its isolation and secure access to 
markets, Vietnam withdrew from 
Cambodia in 1989. Subsequently, to 
ensure external support for “đổi mới”, 
Vietnam adopted a policy of pro-active 
international integration and became a 
member of all major global economic 
institutions. To ensure its strategic 
autonomy more broadly, Vietnam 
diversified its diplomatic and strategic 
relations. As a result, today Vietnam is a 
member in good standing of major global 
institutions, a leader in ASEAN, and 
increasingly integrated in the global 
economy (Thayer, 2017). 
The Linkage Between Indonesia-
Vietnam National Interest to Tackle 
Illegal Fishing as a Maritime Security 
Threat 
The main argument of this paper is 
that the problem of Illegal fishing between 
Indonesia and Vietnam within unsettled 
Economic Exclusive Zone near to Natuna 
Islands occurred in interconnected 
complex systems. In this sense, a complex 
system formed when interactions between 
actors’ process dynamically in nature. A 
system is an integrated whole in which 
this process of interplay cannot be broken 
down and the actors cannot be separated 
(Kawaguchi, 2003, p.30). Especially, 
within international system, any states 
decide their actions in the context of its 
relationships with other states; 
constitutively among them share basic 
assumption that other state’s acting in 
their own national interests. Thus, a 
relationship between two states often is 
one in which national interests collide. 
This situation, according to Kawaguchi 
could lead the nature of interaction 
between actors in international system 
into “a relationship that will inevitably 
lead to the use of force, a struggle for life 
by every available means,” or even what 
could be called a Hobbesian state of 
nature (Kawaguchi, 2003, p.52).  We claim 
the recent challenge faced by Indonesia-
Vietnam regarding Illegal fishing can be 
another empirical record that when state-
state relations intertwined as complex 
systems, the key to manage tension lies on 
the synergy between those relations. 
When it does, even if the sovereign states 
anxious might have appeared to be 
motivated only by their national interests 
or by the desire for power, all of them 
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shared common internalized ideals 
because they had come into being in the 
same region (Kawaguchi, 2003). 
High tensions between Indonesia 
and Vietnam over IUU Fishing activity 
started from Indonesia’s policy to destroy 
hundreds of vessels, mostly Vietnam 
origins. Popular online media in Indonesia 
recorded that since serving as Minister of 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi 
Pudjiastuti, managed to implement STV 
policy. The number of illegal fishing 
vessels that had drowned since October 
2014 until April 1, 2017 were 317 ships, 
with details as following: 142 Vietnamese 
vessels, 76 Philippines vessels, 21 
Thailand vessels, 49 Malaysian vessels, 21 
Indonesian ships, 2 Papua New Guinea 
ships, 1 China ship, 1 Belize ship and 4 
ships from unidentified country (Kuwado, 
2017). Indonesia’s decision to firmly 
execute the policy was aimed to secure the 
maritime resources, as stated by Susi 
Pudjiastuti as the Minister of Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries. "I am not talking 
about the territorial authority, but about 
maritime resources and fish. Fish in our 
exclusive economic zone is our fish” 
(Tempo.co, 2016). 
Responding such situation, 
Vietnam realizes the need to express its 
concern about Indonesia's firm policy 
related to IUU Fishing. On August 2015, 
Hanoi’s foreign ministry spokesman 
stated that Vietnam is highly considerate 
about Indonesia sinking Vietnamese 
vessels for illegally fishing in Indonesian 
waters. According to Tuoi Tre News, Le 
Hai Binh, the spokesperson for Vietnam’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said Vietnam 
felt “deeply concerned” about the sinking 
of fishing boats belonging to Vietnamese 
fishermen who had violated Jakarta’s 
territorial waters. Binh added that 
Vietnam had sent a diplomatic note to 
Indonesia Thursday recommending that 
Jakarta “(pay) attention to the strategic 
partnership of the two nations” in 
handling Vietnamese fishermen 
(Parameswaran, 2015). 
In recent decade, Vietnamese-
Indonesian relations have come into a new 
period of collaboration. The ongoing 
Vietnam-Indonesia Strategic Partnership 
was designed to improve economic 
relations throughout the 2014-2018 period. 
The target set up to US$10 billion of two-
way trade by 2018 (Ward, 2017). During 
Deputy Prime Minister, Vuong Dinh 
Hue’s recent visit to Indonesia in July 
2017, he highlighted the importance of 
Vietnam’s regional economic connectivity. 
He specifically mentioned the significance 
of the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership, which both Vietnam and 
Indonesia are a part of. Hue also 
reinforced Vietnamese and Indonesian 
collaboration on common viewpoint 
initiatives such as sustainability, natural 
disaster response, water management and 
food security. However, Hue’s list of 
cooperation did not mention about 
maritime and fishery issues. As the 
economic relationship between the two 
nations has grew more massive, the lack 
of cooperation over these prominent 
issues is even more glaring (Ward, 2017). 
Accordingly, the Indonesia’s STV policy 
undermine the reinforcement of bilateral 
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relations between two states. At this point, 
it is likely that both Vietnam and 
Indonesia are standing on a critical 
juncture, where the complicated problem 
that occur needs to be immediately 
responded. 
Complex systems approach offers 
more comprehensive picture of how 
interaction between states bring up a very 
complex system; based on interest 
behaviour, role expectation behaviour, 
and symbol behaviour. This 
interconnectedness may affect and 
transform state interests and behaviour. 
The explanations fit into the way 
Indonesia-Vietnam projected its interest 
and role as an agent of socialisation to 
respond problematic situation among 
ASEAN countries. By utilizing any 
opportunity to engage in constructive 
dialogue among actors, both by bilateral 
and multilateral, the problem could be 
settled by formal or informal interaction 
between them. This is the basic element to 
elevate constitutive common purpose to 
organize mutual issues between actors.   
In this case, if the social arena to maintain 
common purpose between them was not 
exist, the problem between Indonesia – 
Vietnam regarding IUU Fishing will be 
more complicated to be resolved. 
Since Indonesia implementing STV 
policy to manage its maritime security, 
Vietnam put serious consideration about 
Indonesia act of sinking Vietnamese 
vessels who illegally fishing in its waters 
(Parameswaran, 2015). Pham Thu Hang, 
spokesperson for Vietnam’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, stated that Vietnam had 
contacted Indonesia about the sinking of 
Vietnamese-flagged boats and appealed to 
Indonesia to deal with the fishermen “in 
accordance with international laws, based 
on humane spirit and on the relations 
between Indonesia and other countries.” 
(Thayer, 2014). In addition, in a separated 
explanatory note by the government of 
Vietnam, it stated that “to closely 
coordinate in dealing with issues relating 
to fishermen and fishing boats that 
encroach each side’s territorial waters on 
the basis of humanity and friendship” 
(MoFA, 2013). Meanwhile, Jakarta insists 
that the policy is not only needed but it 
should be executed given the scale of the 
problem of IUU Fishing in Indonesian 
waters. 
Under this condition, refer to 
Robert Jervis (1976) argument in his 
famous work “Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics”, 
this condition conventionally exacerbate 
the spin of international insecurity among 
disputing parties. Because the attempts of 
one state to achieve security precipitate 
the feeling of insecurity of other states 
(Jervis, 1976). Jervis, as one of many realist 
scholars in International Relations, 
believes that all states tend to assume the 
worst of others and respond accordingly. 
These unintended and undesired 
consequences of actions lead to a situation 
called ‘security dilemma’ that Herbert 
Butterfield sees as that ‘absolute 
predicament’ that ‘lies in the very 
geometry of human conflict. […] Here is 
the basic pattern for all narratives of 
human conflict, whatever other patterns 
may be superimposed upon it later.’ 
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(Jervis, 1991). From this point of view, the 
unilateral movement by Indonesia’s 
government to seek security by 
implementing hard measure regarding 
IUU Fishing could trigger hostility of 
Vietnam’s perception toward Indonesia’s 
action. In addition, according to Jervis 
“The perceptions and reactions of the 
other side are apt to deepen the 
misunderstanding and the conflict”. 
Nonetheless, after the implementation of 
this unilateral movement, not to mention 
all the incidents between state apparatus 
regarding IUU Fishing law enforcement, 
the relationship between Indonesia-
Vietnam is far from hostile condition. An 
interview with a mid-level diplomatic 
staff from The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Indonesia confirm this 
statement “It is true, our firm policy did 
not exacerbate Indonesia-Vietnam 
bilateral relations. Moreover, in 2017, 
Indonesia and Vietnam had undergone an 
improvement of both states defence 
bilateral cooperation”.  This event also 
publicly records by credible media: 
As Indonesia-Vietnam relations 
have developed over the 
years……. Recent defence 
dialogues have focused on 
further steps to implement 
their memorandum of 
understanding inked in 2010, 
efforts to develop defence ties 
more generally including joint 
exercises, dialogues, and 
military equipment, and means 
to better manage challenges, 
including the treatment of 
fishermen amid some recent 
clashes at sea (Parameswaran, 
2017). 
Moreover, responding to 
Indonesia’s concern toward IUU Fishing, 
Indonesia-Vietnam utilizing any 
instrument to promote IUU Fishing as a 
common challenge through various 
multilateral dialogues. For instance, at 
ASEAN Regional Forum on Illegal, 
Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) 
Fishing held in Bali, Arif Havas 
Oegroseno, Deputy Minister for Maritime 
Sovereignty, Coordinating Ministry of 
Maritime Affairs of the Republic of 
Indonesia, highlighted the possible 
measures to address the issue. Countries 
in the region should ratify the Port State 
Measures Agreement (PSMA) and its 
provisions should be promoted and 
adopted as regional norms. Regional 
instruments should also be established 
with focus on combating the IUU fishing, 
enhancing coordination and information 
sharing, as well as building cooperation in 
law enforcement (ARF workshop, 2016). 
At the same forum, the delegation 
of Vietnam conveyed a statement 
highlighting its national efforts and 
perspective on IUU Fishing. One 
important aspect emphasized is that 
Vietnam has fulfilled its diligence and 
obligation to combat IUU Fishing by 
undertaking specific measures to prevent, 
deter, and eliminate IUU Fishing. The 
implementation occurs in form of 
educating fishermen not to conduct IUU 
Fishing in other states’ waters (ARF 
Workshop, 2016). ASEAN Security 
community, in this view, play its role as 
an agent of socialization and social arena 
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to resolve common problem in the region 
through a set of community practices. 
In this case, Indonesia’s unilateral 
movement through discursive practices 
within the system was projected as a 
common problem for Vietnam. This 
condition constructs a “We Feelings” and 
alleviate mistrust among actors. This 
situation displayed through Vietnam 
delegation statement “Vietnam also 
underscored its willingness to cooperate 
with other countries, because it too is a 
victim of IUU Fishing conducted by 
foreign vessels (ARF Workshop, 2016). 
This statement was further reinforced by 
Vietnamese National Assembly and had 
passed the revised Law on Fisheries, 
including new features to strengthen 
illegal unreported unregulated (IUU) 
fishing fight (Fis.com, 2017). This 
constructive measure followed with a 
recent Vietnam’s national effort to tackle 
IUU Fishing through implementing 
national action plan to prevent, mitigate 
and abolish illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing until 2025 
(Vietnamnews.vn, 2018). The approach of 
the two countries that emphasizes 
constructive dialogue in understanding 
the problems that occur, reinforces our 
opinion that through habituation in the 
practice of community at the international 
level, it can encourage peaceful inquiry in 
the event of conflict between members of 
the international community. Certainly, 
this is possible because of the linkages 
within the system, where both countries 
interact as social units continuously. The 
recent statement by Vietnamese 
Ambassador to Indonesia Hong Anh 
Tuan, support this paper point of view 
that under difficult time both countries 
uphold the primacy of regional peace, 
security and stability "ASEAN is very 
important for Vietnam and Indonesia and 
we see the great role of Indonesia in 
strengthening ASEAN cooperation," 
(Antara News, 2018). Therefore, this paper 
prudently claims that Indonesia-Vietnam 
relations post “Sink the Vessels” policy is 
guided under the framework of complex 
systems. The Indonesia-Vietnam 
cooperation to tackle the problem stems 
primarily from each country’s interest, 
role-expectation of others, and the symbol 
associated with them. Thus, the 
construction of inter-subjective meanings 
to develop shared understanding, 
identity, and interest which mutually 
constitutes as non-material aspects that 
affect their relations could maintain the 
anarchy situation and even eliminate the 
possibility of security dilemma. 
The Role of Symbol System to Tackle the 
Rising Tension Between Indonesia-
Vietnam 
The next explanation to reinforce 
this article proposition toward Indonesia-
Vietnam peaceful diplomatic conduct post 
to STV policy stand on the symbol-
oriented behaviour that developed within 
symbol system as a common ground 
between both countries. In this context, 
constructivist International Relations 
scholars already saturated with the 
discourse about the primacy of norms as 
ideational matters that govern state-state 
relations, especially when it comes to 
ASEAN countries. One of them, Amitav 
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Acharya (2009) shows that the members of 
ASEAN have generally adhered to one of 
the core diplomatic norms enshrined in its 
constitutional documents, the non-use of 
force in intra-mural relations, during a 
thirty-year period: 1967–97. This is the 
main basic norm that enfold bilateral 
relations among members in ASEAN, 
including Indonesia-Vietnam in our case. 
At this point, norms are beneficial to 
coordinate values among states and 
societies. 
In this context, Indonesia-Vietnam 
(Both are ASEAN members) adherence to 
the non-use of force in intra-mural 
relations as the core diplomatic norms 
could help them to negate the perception 
of threats against each other, even 
counteract the misperception of their 
increasing military capacity as a 
preparation of war. Considering 
Indonesia-Vietnam military build-ups, 
both countries experienced increased 
military expenditure in the last 10 years. 
Since arms races usually emerge as an 
impact of threat perception that elevate 
security dilemma among the conflicting 
countries, the increase of military 
expenditure can create a detrimental effect 
because it could be perceived as 
preliminary sign as some organized 
preparations for war. 
According to the data from 
Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), military expenditure in 
Indonesia increased from US$ 3722 
Million in 2009 to 7911 USD Million in 
2017. Whereas, in similar timeline with 
Indonesia, Vietnam’s military expenditure 
is increasing from US$ 3044 Million to US$ 
4962 Million (SIPRI, 2018).  Nonetheless, 
under this condition, Indonesia’s STV 
policy did not trigger security dilemma 
between Indonesia-Vietnam. To put it 
clear, this article strengthening Deutsch’s 
proposition that within security 
community military build-ups between 
members did not automatically lead to 
competition and security dilemma. 
History reveals itself, Southeast Asian 
countries have managed interstate 
disputes short of armed conflict and 
developed peaceful settlement of disputes 
through consultation and dialogue. To 
that extent, despite intra-mural squabbles 
and differences, Indonesia-Vietnam 
diplomatic step to tackle the problem 
reinforcing the fact that norms matter in 
shaping solution between conflicting 
countries. 
The recent clash between two 
countries state apparatus and how the 
backlash can be managed is a perfect 
example of the way norms could help 
states to coordinate values among states 
and societies. The incident in Natuna 
occurred when the ministry's patrol boat 
Hiu Macan intercepted five foreign fishing 
vessels from Vietnam that had trespassed 
into Indonesian EEZ in Natuna. At the 
same time, the Vietnamese Coast Guard 
boat demanded those boats to be released 
(Republika.co, 2017). The incident led to a 
collision and sinking of a Vietnamese 
fishing boat. Around 44 fishermen jumped 
into the sea and were later rescued by the 
Vietnamese Coast Guard. 
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For ASEAN members States, the 
norm of non-use of forces to settle dispute 
is not something new. How Indonesia-
Vietnam handle the clash between them in 
this problem stands for this norm, to 
tackle the possibility for the incident 
endangering Indonesia-Vietnam bilateral 
relations, the Indonesian and Vietnamese 
governments have diplomatically agreed 
to solve the Natuna incident that occurred 
in Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) in May 21, as stated by Marine 
Affairs and Fishery Ministry's Secretary, 
General Rifki Effendi Hardijanto. 
Responding this incident in a conducive 
and cooperative manner, Indonesia and 
Vietnam have carried out a joint 
investigation to settle the incident, which 
according to Indonesian authorities, the 
Vietnamese coast guard has tried to 
forcibly free five fishing boats and their 
crew detained in waters near the Natuna 
Islands (Reuters.com, 2017).  
Moreover, during Prime Minister 
Nguyen Xuan Phuc diplomatic visit to 
discussed about opportunity to elevate 
cooperation between the two countries to 
new heights, bringing tangible benefits to 
their peoples. Apart from bilateral 
agreement for facilitating market access 
between two countries, in order to aiming 
bilateral trade on amount of US$10 billion. 
PM Phuc also thanked the Indonesian 
Government for the return of 177 
Vietnamese fishermen arrested and 
detained in Indonesia, proposing both 
sides regularly exchange information and 
handle the issue of arrested fishermen and 
fishing vessels in a humanitarian spirit 
and in accordance with the good relations 
between two countries. Then, the two 
sides agreed to accelerate the 
establishment of a hotline on fishing and 
sea-related issues, while actively 
coordinating to implement the joint 
communiqué on voluntary international 
cooperation against illegal, unreported 
and unregulated (IUU) fishing signed last 
month. Also, the two leaders welcomed 
the progress in the demarcation of the 
exclusive economic zones (EEZ) between 
the two countries after 11 rounds of 
negotiations and consented to work 
harder for a solution suitable for both 
sides and in line with international law 
(vietnamnews.vn, 2018). The constructive 
way between Indonesia-Vietnam to 
manage IUU Fishing as maritime security 
threats that endangering their bilateral 
relations is a solid proved that both 
countries shared common visions and 
committed to increasing cooperation and 
coordination at international forums, 
especially within the frameworks of 
ASEAN. 
Conclusion 
This article explained that lately 
Indonesia and Vietnam relations has been 
tested over IUU Fishing activity. The 
tension started from Indonesia’s firm 
policy to destroy hundreds of vessels, 
mostly Vietnam origins.  Authors reach 
the conclusion by answering question of 
how could Indonesia’s foreign policy 
action did not further aggravated 
Indonesia-Vietnam relations post “Sink 
the Vessels” policy? The answer to this 
intriguing question is derived from our 
core argument that the rising tension 
174 The Unbreakable Relations between Indonesia-Vietnam 
 
between Indonesia – Vietnam post “Sink 
the Vessels” policy took place within 
complex systems that connecting 
Indonesia-Vietnam as actors in 
international politics. Which has 
developed a long-term habit of peaceful 
interaction and ruled out the use of force 
in settling disputes. Our analysis shows 
that based on interest system, role-
expectation system, and symbol system, 
Indonesia-Vietnam determined their 
national interest. Meanwhile, the symbol 
system practically, influence by symbol 
system at the larger social unit which is 
ASEAN. Both of them, within complex 
systems, contribute as an agent of 
socialisation to respond problematic 
situation among ASEAN countries 
through community practices. Thus, our 
systematic description about Indonesia-
Vietnam dynamic relations post unilateral 
movement by Indonesia exposes that 
Indonesia-Vietnam cooperation to tackle 
the problem stems primarily from each 
country’s interest behaviour, role-
expectation behaviour, and symbols 
associated with them. Therefore, the 
construction of inter-subjective meanings 
to develop shared understanding, 
identity, and interest which mutually 
constitutes as non-material aspects that 
affect their relations could manage 
anarchy and even escape the security 
dilemma. 
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